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Sanders: Leading the National Security Enterprise

Introduction
Today’s complex, chaotic, and interconnected world has forced us to rethink
some of our fundamental assumptions about the nature of leadership,
especially when it comes to leading whole-of-government or even whole-ofnation efforts. This is especially the case in the U.S. national security
enterprise (hereafter referred to as the NSE or enterprise) where a complex,
diverse constellation of military and civilian agencies must wield both hard
and soft power on behalf of the United States. For various reasons, that
enterprise has become our nation’s “first responder” when it comes to almost
any challenge, from traditional military operations to a myriad of nonmilitary
ones, to include disaster and pandemic relief and humanitarian assistance
(the Ebola crisis comes to mind), post–conflict reconstruction, and even
nation-building. Irrespective of the challenge, our nation’s political leaders
look to senior officers—particularly but not exclusively those in uniform—who
are in, and/or who have been developed by our NSE to lead the way.
However, are they prepared for what we ask of them? As former U.S. Coast
Guard Commandant, Admiral Thad Allen and others (including myself) have
argued, almost everything of any consequence that government does today is
collaboratively co-produced by a complex collection of public and private
entities, from other agencies and levels of government, to nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and even other countries, and international bodies.1
This is becoming the “new normal” for national leaders—whether they are
elected, or in the case of senior career military and civilian officials, appointed
or selected—and it has made their job exponentially more difficult. From the
short-term dramas of pandemics, hurricanes, ecological disasters, and “lone
wolf” terrorist attacks to the decades-long challenges of homeland security,
energy independence, the health of our veterans and, at the extreme, great
power competition and conflict—virtually everything government does
requires the concerted efforts of complex networks that are comprised of
multiple actors and organizations.
In this regard, there is a realization among senior government leaders, both
military and civilian, that the national security challenges they face can no
longer be addressed by individual agencies or commands, each narrowly
1 Building a 21st Century Senior Executive Service: Ensuring Leadership Excellence in
our Federal Government, ed. Ronald Sanders (National Academy of Public
Administration, 2017). See also Tackling Wicked Government Problems: A Practical
guide for Enterprise Leader, Nickerson and Sanders, ed., (Brookings Institution Press,
second edition 2014).
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(even myopically) focused on its own specialized authorities and
responsibilities. Rather, as those challenges become even more complex and
interdependent, leaders at all levels—all with potentially overlapping
jurisdictions and diverse areas of expertise—are required to collaborate with
one another towards some common mission outcome. Thus, NSE leaders
must have the meta-leadership skills to reach beyond their immediate
organizations and mobilize a network of interdependent actors to achieve a
shared mission and in so doing, achieve outcomes that are greater than the
sum of their individual parts.2

A New Kind of NSE
For purposes of this paper, NSE is defined in two ways. First, in concept, it
represents all of the various departments and agencies, mostly though not
exclusively federal, that have some responsibility for the U.S. national and
homeland security missions broadly defined. This includes the “usual
suspects” like the Defense Department (DOD) and the elements of the
Intelligence Community (IC), but it also includes parts of the Departments of
Energy, State, Justice, and Commerce, as well as more specialized agencies
and departmental subcomponents like the United States Agency for
International Development, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and
the National Oceanic and Administrative Administration.
Not every element of that constellation of organizations will be relevant to a
particular circumstance—indeed, that is part of the leadership challenge—so
the second definition is more situational. In that context, the NSE is that
operational subset of those institutional entities that may be necessary to
accomplish a specific national or international mission sanctioned by the
United States as relevant to its national security. These situationally relevant
constellations can include federal, state, and local government departments
and agencies, their subordinate bureaus and divisions, and even tribal
governments. But they can also encompass the private sector and not-forprofit NGOs, the United Nations, the International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
even organizations like the International Red Cross, Doctors Without
Borders, and their regional counterparts and analogs.

2 Adapted from Building a 21st Century Senior Executive Service, Sanders, ed., (National
Academy of Public Administration, 2017). See also See Tackling Wicked Government
Problem. See also Marcus, L., et all, “Crisis preparedness and Crisis Response: The metaLeadership Model and Method,” in D. Kamien, ed., McGraw-Hill Homeland Security
Handbook. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2012).
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And a New Kind of National Security Leader
Whatever the combination, our national leaders increasingly look to someone
in or from the NSE to lead them, even when the national security implications
may not seem so apparent. The challenge may be strategic and long-term, to
address global issues such as migration, drought, and climate change (yes,
that too has been defined as a national security issue), or regional ones such
as the Syrian civil war and its attendant refugee crisis, North Korea’s
bellicosity, or the fragile European Union. Or it may be more operational,
such as border security, counterterrorism, or emergency management during
a disaster.
While the composition and purpose of the constellation may vary—indeed, it
almost certainly will—there is one common denominator: the mission at hand
involves multiple actors and organizations, each semi-autonomous or
independent, yet bound together to achieve a common task. And it needs
someone to lead them. Take the Ebola crisis of just a few years ago. When it
suddenly metastasized—from something tragic but far from our shores to an
issue that has all sorts of intertwined international and domestic implications
ranging from disease control protocols to border security—the challenges
were enormous. Yet who did the White House (and the world) look to for
leadership in that regard? Civilian and military leaders drawn mostly from the
NSE to coordinate the various elements of this complex enterprise.3
In other words, these whole-of-government and whole-of-nation challenges
are extra-organizational in nature (a characteristic that has significant
implications for the development of enterprise leaders), and they require a
leader who can achieve unity of effort—among multiple entities, each with its
own agenda, interests, culture, and politics—without the luxury of unity of
command. To do so requires a whole new set of leadership competencies that,
with some exception, have not been deliberately or formally developed by the
NSE.

What Makes for an Effective NSE Leader?
It is clear that the effective NSE leader needs to have a deep understanding of
the institutional, organizational, and (especially) the individual actors that
comprise the enterprise, and that does not mean just an understanding of

3 As well as a special military-like “czar" (Ron McCain, who demonstrated many of the
qualities of a NSE leader) appointed by—and reporting directly to—to the President, with
the implicit power of that office.
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their missions and structures and budgets and bureaucratic processes.
Although those are important, the enterprise leader must also understand
their mindsets—a product of their histories and cultures, their traditions and
stories, even their heroes and lore—if he or she is going to be successful. The
NSE leader must also acquire the empathy to see their shared challenge from
a collective, inter-subjective point of view, rather than a strictly parochial one.
Second, the NSE leader must be able to connect the dots across that
enterprise; that is, to be able to see and understand the NSE as a dynamic,
interconnected social system, with complex formal and informal interrelationships and inter-dependencies, positive and negative feedback loops,
etc. that exist between and among the enterprise’s constituent organizations.
The leader must also understand how the relevant parts of the NSE interact
with those other elements of the enterprise that may act in opposition to its
interest and objectives. Finally, since those organizations are populated—and
more importantly, led—by people, the NSE leader must also be able to grasp
the complex social networks that exist within and among those counterparts
(formal and otherwise) who can influence action, build new relational
networks, and most importantly, leverage them to achieve the aim of the
enterprise.
Finally, the enterprise leader needs to be able to lead without formal
authority, well- beyond his or her official chain of command. This quality
distinguishes the NSE leader from his or her more internally-focused
colleagues, for while they too must be able to exercise influence over peers
and colleagues of equal stature and rank, they do so in the context of a shared
chain of command that ultimately leads to the head of the component, agency
or department—where the buck stops. In most cases, the NSE leader enjoys
no such luxury. Thus, while in theory, all such leaders and their organizations
report to the President, there is no such practical reality, and without effective
enterprise leadership, interagency impasses often fester, or worse, become
muddled and mired in the search for the lowest common denominator
consensus.
In today’s NSE, inter-dependence (or inter-reliance) is the rule, rather than
the exception. Senior officials or commanders in one or more of its
constituent organizations will rarely have any sort of formal, chain of
command authority over the entire network of extra-organizational
components that are critical to the success of the enterprise; however, those
senior officials may still be held personally accountable for that success.
Today this is an all-too-common contradiction to the classic axiom that
81
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss4/5
DOI: http://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.4.1650

Sanders: Leading the National Security Enterprise

authority must match accountability. To be successful, the NSE leader
requires certain boundary-spanning, net-centric competencies and
characteristics that are fundamentally different from those implicitly intraorganizational competencies necessary to lead any one of the enterprise’s
organizational components.
To be sure, this unity of effort can be achieved on a transactional basis. Two
or more organizations can achieve common ends simply by barter and
exchange of information, resources, people, even promises (i.e. “if you do this
for me, I will do this for you”). However, that transactional approach can be
fragile and often results in a “whole” that is less than the sum of its parts. A
NSE built on transactions may not be resilient enough for the challenges it
must confront, and while some transactions are inevitable, a necessary
precondition to enterprise, they are not likely to be resilient enough to
weather the mission turbulence that is also inevitable. To be up to its wicked
task, an enterprise must be built on a shared sense of mission, shared values
and interests, shared experiences, and trust. And it takes a special kind of
leader to be able to create and leverage those conditions across an enterprise.
This kind of challenge is largely immune to the hard power of chain of
command authority. Instead, it requires collaborative, integrated, soft power
leadership to mobilize and unify the complex network of co-producers who
share any given mission space. This has significant implications for leadership
development. While these competencies are now required (and expected) of
senior NSE leaders, they are not specifically developed in them. This needs to
change.

Developing NSE Leaders: A Brief History
While it may not use precisely these terms, certain parts of the NSE
recognized the nascent need for this kind of integrated, boundary-spanning
leadership, at least in the military domain. More than 30 years ago, a few
visionaries realized (after some painful lessons on a small island named
Grenada) that to effectively fight—and more importantly, win—modern wars,
our armed forces needed to operate in a far more integrated way. In response,
they made jointness part of our commissioned officer corps’ genetic code, the
result of the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986.4

4 Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99433 (1986).
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And as a practical matter, that integration was codified by the more
mechanical but no less effective mandate that a military officer must complete
at least one joint duty assignment as a prerequisite to promotion to flag rank.
That requirement forced the development of military leaders who, at least in
theory, could focus on the entire domain of hard power combat arms. Many
attribute the phenomenal success of the U.S. armed forces during and since
Desert Shield/Desert Storm to its unifying effects. However, as farsighted as
the NSE was in that regard, even it never anticipated—nor prepared its
leaders for—the challenges of the Ebola plague, nation-building, or
countering violent Islamic extremism.
Nevertheless, while the notion of jointness represented a great leap forward in
leadership, the painful lessons that led to it had to be relearned by the U.S.
Intelligence Community (IC) on September 11, 2001. The tragic events that
transpired are all too familiar, and they need not be recounted here; however,
it is useful to consider the reasons for the apparent failure of the federal
government’s intelligence and law enforcement agencies to detect and prevent
the attacks.
In that regard, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) concluded that among other
things, the IC lacked senior leaders who had the wherewithal to lead the
entire U.S. Intelligence Community, and in so doing, know, understand, and
most importantly, integrate all of the IC’s collection, analytic, and kinetic
capabilities to deal with the terrorist threat as it evolved. The more-or-less
contemporaneous Presidential Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of
the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq (otherwise
known as the WMD Commission), reached a similar conclusion concerning
that particular intelligence failure: just as with 9/11, the IC lacked—and
desperately needed—senior leaders who had an enterprise-wide perspective.
Those conclusions—as well as the lessons that precipitated Goldwater–
Nichols—were not lost on the subsequent drafters of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), and they mandated a similar
approach in the IC. Specifically, the IRTPA required that the newly created
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) “seek to duplicate joint [military]
officer management policies established by…the Goldwater–Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.” More specifically, it
authorized the DNI to “prescribe mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of
[civilian] personnel of the intelligence community through various elements
of the intelligence community in the course of their careers” and to make such
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interagency assignments “a condition of promotion to such positions within
the intelligence community as the Director shall specify,” all in an effort to
mirror the military requirement established by Goldwater–Nichols.5
With those statutory mandates in-hand, the Office of the DNI (ODNI)
established a civilian equivalent of the military’s joint duty policy, requiring
IC professionals to complete at least one extended interagency assignment as
a mandatory prerequisite for promotion to senior executive rank—the civilian
equivalent of a general officer in the military. 6 This requirement applied to
each of the autonomous senior services that covered civilian leaders within
the IC, including the “regular” Senior Executive Service (SES), as well as the
DOD and FBI SES corp(s), and the CIA’s Senior Intelligence Service.7
For those that completed such a civilian joint duty assignment (or JDA, as it
came to be known) and became eligible to compete for such promotions,
ODNI also identified and validated a set of competencies that were intended
to describe the qualities of someone capable of “Leading the Intelligence
Enterprise,” which collectively served as the basis for rating and ranking
candidates for such promotions.8 Those requirements remain in effect to this
day, and they have produced a senior leadership cadre in the IC that is close
to 100 percent “joint” in nature.
However, the IC was not the only part of the Federal government to recognize
this emerging leadership requirement. At about the same time, then Deputy
Secretary of Defense Gordon England established a similar set of
requirements for the estimated 1,300 senior civilian career executives within
DOD. Because it lacked a legislative mandate comparable to the Goldwater–
Nichols Act or the IC’s Intelligence Reform Act, the Department chose not to
establish interagency mobility (and the leadership competencies associated
with it) as a mandatory prerequisite for entry into those senior executive
ranks; however, DOD officials did make a mobility assignment after an
individual’s initial SES selection a mandatory prerequisite for promotion to

5 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118
Stat. 3638 (2004).
6 In the interest of full disclosure, this author led that effort for the DNI. As noted, the IC
has far more senior civilian positions than DOD does flag officers and career executives.
7 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Intelligence Community Directive
No. 660, Intelligence Community Civilian Joint Duty Program (2013), available at:
https://fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-660.pdf.
8 Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Intelligence Community Directive
No. 610, Competency Directories for the Intelligence Community Workforce (2010),
available at: https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD_610.pdf.
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higher-than-entry-level SES rank. 9 Unfortunately, for various reasons, the
strict enforcement of those requirements has been uneven, and the
Department’s civilian executive corps reflects that fact.
Other parts of the Federal government’s NSE also saw the need for these
enterprise leadership competencies during and immediately after Hurricane
Katrina, when unconnected federal, state, and local relief efforts made a
horrendous natural disaster even worse. However, there was a silver lining of
sorts. The Homeland Security Council’s after-action review of the disaster led
to the issuance of Executive Order 13434, National Security Professional
Development (NSPD), by President George W. Bush, which established its
namesake program.10 Taking a page from similar efforts (and antecedents!) in
DOD and the IC, the NSPD program was specifically designed to develop the
very same enterprise leadership competencies across the agencies that made
up the U.S. National Security establishment. In so doing, it sought to produce
enterprise leaders who could successfully lead a whole-of-government/wholeof-nation response to the next Katrina.11
Unfortunately, that well-intentioned vision was never fully realized in the
Bush Administration, and for years thereafter, the NSPD program atrophied
from benign neglect. The U.S. Office of Personnel Management made a
laudable but belated attempt to reinvigorate the program in July of 2016,
issuing guidance that encouraged agencies to identify those senior civilian
positions in the NSE that require interagency experience as a technical
qualification requirement (although not necessarily a leadership one); and it
urged the use of temporary and permanent career-broadening assignments,
as well as existing inter-agency rotation programs like the one sponsored by
the President’s Management Council, to develop candidates who could meet
that requirement. It also commended agencies to afford those candidates who
had actually acquired such interagency leadership experience “strong
preference” when making selections for those executive positions.12 However,
9 Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986. See also Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004. See also U.S. Department of Defense Directive No. 1400.25, Vol. 1403
(1996), DOD Civilian Personnel Management System.
10 Exec. Order No. 13434, National security professional development, May 17, 2007,
available at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2007-05-21/pdf/WCPD-2007-0521-Pg650.pdf.
11 Ibid.
12 National Security Professional Development (NSPD) Interagency Personnel Rotations
Program Guidance [OPM letter, June 2016], available at:
https://www.chcoc.gov/content/national-security-professional-development-nspdinteragency-personnel-rotations-program-0. In its most recent NSPD guidance, OPM
recommends the PMC program and encourages agencies to give those who complete its
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as is evident, this guidance was largely hortatory and its impact accordingly
negligible.

Developing the “New” National Security Leader
The goal of Executive Order 13434—that is, the establishment of a
professional development program for the entire NSE—remains as valid today
as it was when it was first issued more than a decade ago, perhaps even more
so. That Enterprise has an emergent but no less urgent need for a cadre of
senior leaders, both military and civilian, who understand all of its
complexities and interconnectedness, and more importantly, who have the
competencies to be able to lead effectively across the entire national security
mission space.
However, as important as that cadre may be to the effective operation of the
NSE overall, the actual development and deployment of its individual leaders
remains the internal—and largely unconnected—responsibility of its
individual departments and agencies (and in the case of DOD, its individual
components). For the most part, those individual agencies make the day-today decisions so crucial to leader development—who to develop, promote,
reward, assign—and this means that the senior leaders they produce reflect
their individual, agency-centric missions and cultures. The net result: senior
leaders, even those in uniform, who find it increasingly difficult to deal with
the sorts of whole-of-government and whole-of-nation challenges that they
are asked to lead.
Moreover, those individual agency-level leadership development efforts have
been uneven at best. For example, while the U.S. military sets the gold
standard for uniformed leader development, particularly of the joint kind, its
civilian leadership development efforts lag far behind. Yet even those efforts
surpass most other civilian national security agencies, which under-invest in
leadership development of even the most basic kind, especially when
compared to DOD overall. And as one would expect, the situation is even
worse at the enterprise level. Only the 17 elements of the IC—a relatively small
fraction of the total NSE—operate under a common, interdepartmental leader
development framework established by the DNI.
Thus, in my view, the NSE urgently needs to develop and execute an
enterprise-wide executive-level talent management strategy that is designed
required 6-month rotational assignment “strong preference” in SES positions that require
a whole-of-government perspective.
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to deliberately develop and deploy its senior military and civilian leaders
across its entire potential mission space. And that strategy must include (1)
some sort of multi-agency governance structure to devise it, and then to
manage its day-to-day execution; (2) the identification and validation of the
leadership competencies that are critical to leadership success at the
enterprise level; (3) a curriculum of formal enterprise leadership education,
perhaps including the NSE equivalent of the National Defense University; and
lastly (4) policies and processes to require and manage mobility across the
entire spectrum of the enterprise, as the most effective way to acquire and
demonstrate those competencies.

Competencies as the DNA of Enterprise Leadership
These days, the science of leadership and leader development typically starts
with competencies…the knowledges, skills, abilities, and attributes that taken
together, make for an effective leader. In effect, those competencies represent
the DNA of an organization’s leadership, and to stretch the human genome
analogy a bit, there are almost as many leadership competency models in the
literature (and in practice) as there are combinations of chromosomes. That
said, the competencies required of senior leaders in the NSE are emergent,
and with some exception, they are not likely part of most traditional (that is,
existing) leadership competency models, except perhaps by accident.
In that regard, we must acknowledge the inherent limitations of those
traditional leadership competency models. The vast majority—especially
those preached and practiced in our own NSE—implicitly assume that senior
leaders enjoy authority commensurate with their accountability, clear unity of
command, and the hard power of positional authority; indeed, even though
those models may advocate a kinder, gentler application of that hard power,
the superior-subordinate relationships that underlie it remain, albeit
unspoken. Thus, when the leader speaks, gently or otherwise, his or her
subordinates are expected to obey. However, while NSE leaders will regularly
face challenges that are largely immune to the hard power of chain-ofcommand authority, the leadership competencies necessary to do so have yet
to be identified for the NSE writ large.
The IC and DOD offer a good start in that regard, having done so for their
respective senior civilians—and their respective parts of the larger enterprise.
Their competency models suggest that among other things, NSE leaders must
be able to (1) understand the institutional, organizational, and individual
actors that comprise that mission space, to include their cultural mindsets
87
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and even their bureaucratic dialects; (2) conceptualize those actors as a single
dynamic social system, with complex formal and informal interrelationships
and inter-dependencies; (3) identify the patterns and networks of influence
between and among those individual actors and organizations; and (4) build
and leverage those networks to achieve the collective objectives of the
enterprise.
But that is only a start. If the NSE is to begin to develop a cadre of senior
officers, both military and civilian, capable of leading that enterprise, the first
order of business should be to identify and validate (in the technical sense of
the word) the competencies required to do so.13

Mobility to Develop and Demonstrate Enterprise Leadership
Competencies
Assuming the NSE can identify and validate the competencies necessary to
lead it, how does it—and its constituent organizations—go about developing
leaders who can demonstrate them? Given the likely nature of these
competencies, enterprise-wide mobility may be the single most effective way
of doing so, but this prospect is far easier said than done.
The good news: mobility is something embedded in the career development
paradigm (indeed, the very culture) of our armed forces, at least since the end
of World War II. And as previously noted, the U.S. military’s operational
definition of that term was significantly broadened in 1986 by the
requirement in the Goldwater–Nichols Act for one or more joint assignments
as an essential part of an officer’s career path. The not so good news? Those
joint assignments are still largely confined to other military components in
the DOD and do not begin to prepare the most senior military officers for the
challenges associated with the even broader NSE.

13 According to the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (at chapter 29
of the Code of Federal Regulations, §1607), an organization must demonstrate an
empirical relationship between the requirement for a particular competency and actual
success on the job. Many of the leadership competencies proffered by existing models
have not been validated in that technical sense of that word, in part because validation
can be a difficult and time-consuming process; however, it is legally necessary if those
competencies are to be used to make personnel decisions, like who gets selected or
promoted to key leadership positions. Note that for the most part, the military is exempt
from the Uniform Guidelines. Of course, that begs the “who is in charge question,” but
even without its answer, it may be possible the members of the NSE to come to some
agreement on a set of essential leadership competencies.
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However, it is even more problematic on the civilian side of the enterprise. In
theory, all of the various senior civilian services encompassed by that NSE
(like the Senior Executive Service) assume mobility as a condition of
promotion into executive ranks; however, what post–promotion mobility
there is tends to be insular, that is, within the senior executive’s “parent”
department or agency. Thus, while Senior Foreign Service officers are globally
mobile, their mobility is almost exclusively within the confines of the State
Department. Similarly, while senior civilian executives within DOD’s military
departments have become more mobile of late, that mobility is almost
exclusively within their home service.
More importantly for our purposes, unlike the military, civilian mobility
requirements generally attend only after promotion to senior rank, rather
than as a prerequisite thereto. In other words, it is generally not required as
part of civilian leader development. There are some exceptions: for the most
part, the military departments expect some degree of mobility as a
precondition to a civilian’s promotion to senior executive rank; however, it is
not mandatory, and when it does occur, it is almost exclusively within the
civilian’s “home” service. Only in the IC is interagency mobility a mandatory
prerequisite for promotion to senior rank, and it is specifically intended to
ensure that senior promotion candidates are prepared to lead the entire IC,
and not just a single agency.
Thus, it is clear that if the NSE wants senior military and civilian leaders with
the competencies to lead it, it must do two things. First, for military officers, it
must broaden the concept of joint duty—especially as a precursor to flag
rank—to include assignments beyond the Combatant Commands, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff, to other departments and
agencies, multi and international organizations like NATO and the UN, and
even the private sector, via vehicles like the Secretary of Defense’s Corporate
Fellows Program. To be sure, many of those assignments occur today, and
officers receive some joint service credit for completing them, but they are
treated as “consolation prizes” for those not selected for a coveted tour of duty
to a Combatant Command, the Joint Staff, or a senior service school.
For civilians, the answer is even more straightforward: Mobility should be a
mandatory qualification requirement for senior rank, just like it is for civilian
professionals in the IC. That is, before an NSE civilian is even considered for
promotion to flag-equivalent rank. And like their military analogs, civilian
mobility assignments should not be limited to their home agency. If the
objective is to prepare civilians to share the burden of leading the NSE, their
89
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professional development must include assignments across that enterprise.
This should sound familiar, as it is exactly what Executive Order 13434 had in
mind when it established the now largely moribund NSPD program.
One can argue that pre–promotion (developmental) mobility need not be a
necessary prerequisite for all senior national security civilians, especially at
the entry executive level. After all, there will always be a need for highly
specialized technical or functional civilian executives in the NSE, as well as
those who are intimately familiar with a particular agency’s mission.
However, I would contend that even the NSE’s more mundane internal
challenges—administrative, technical, managerial, etc.—would benefit from
leaders who have had these cross-cutting experiences.

Toward a Senior Leader Talent Management Strategy
It should be apparent by now that the 21st century national security
environment demands senior NSE leaders who are able to see the big picture,
take a whole-of-government point of view, employ certain enterprise
leadership competencies to overcome agency-centric stovepipes, and have the
resilience to achieve interagency, intergovernmental, and/or international
unity of effort regardless of the challenge. And thoughtfully planned,
increasingly responsible developmental mobility assignments, starting well
before an individual becomes a senior officer or official, may be the most
effective way to develop those competencies.14
All mobility assignments, developmental and otherwise, must be managed at
the enterprise-level as part of an integrated talent management strategy, but
today, no such corporate mechanism exists to do so. The problem is that as a
practical matter, no one official actually leads the NSE, so developing and
executing such a senior leader development strategy itself becomes an
exercise in collaborative soft power, perhaps led by the President’s National
Security Advisor or a specially designated subset of the National Security
Council’s Principals Committee.
The spotty history of Executive Order 13434 is instructive in this regard.
President Bush initially vested responsibility for implementing his Order with
the Office of Personnel Management, but after several months of relative
inaction—and the personal intervention of the Deputy Director for
Management within the Office of Management and Budget—that

14 Building a 21st Century Senior Executive Service.
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responsibility was transferred to OMB. Thereafter, that same Deputy Director
took it upon himself to bring a sense of urgency to the initiative (after all, who
knew when the next Katrina would hit?) and significant progress was made
during the last two years of the Bush Administration. As the Obama
Administration took office, those involved in the program were optimistic that
this momentum could be sustained, but despite some early hopeful signs—
President Obama’s newly-appointed National Security Advisor was among a
group of current and former national security thought leaders who had
endorsed the concept as part of a report on modernizing the Goldwater–
Nichols Act—that optimism turned out to be short-lived, and implementation
has remained stagnant for much of the past eight years.
So, when it comes to the development and execution of a senior officer talent
management strategy for the NSE, “who will be in charge?” remains the most
vexing question. However, when it comes to the strategy itself, successful
examples exist. For example, DOD comes close, with senior military
assignments (including joint ones) centrally managed by the individual
services and the Joint Staff under broad Department-wide policy guidelines.
As noted, DOD has also established similar policy guidelines for the
development and deployment of its civilian executives, as well as a governing
body—the Defense Executive Advisory Board (DEAB)—to manage them.
Established by a DOD Directive and nominally chaired by the Deputy
Secretary, the DEAB conducts regular executive talent reviews,
recommending decisions about selection, development, and deployment
across the agency; however, DOD tends to focus more on its top career
civilians (tiers two and three of its three-tiered structure) in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the “fourth estate” of defense agencies, leaving the
military services to manage their own civilian executive cadres under the aegis
of the Department’s overarching policy directive. 15
The IC takes a similar federated approach, with each of the six cabinet
departments and two executive agencies (ODNI and CIA) retaining
“ownership” over their respective senior civilian executives—together, they
total more than all of DOD—and managing them accordingly. Moreover, the
larger intelligence subcomponents of those departments—like the National
Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the FBI—also have separate approaches to talent

15 U.S. Department of Defense Directive No. 1400.25, Vol. 1403 (1996), DOD Civilian
Personnel Management System.
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management.16 Thus, while the coordination of senior executive development
and deployment does occur in this federated system, it is far less formal than
DOD’s military and civilian mechanisms.17
Most importantly, DOD and the IC have demonstrated that senior civilian
leader development (to include developmental mobility assignments) can be
managed across cabinet departments, military services, and executive
agencies without asking the heads of those individual departments and
agencies to give up legal “ownership” of their senior leaders. The IC’s version
of this federated model—in which its component departments voluntarily
subscribe to common, multi-departmental leader development framework—
offers a way ahead in that regard.18 But to say that even this federated
approach threatens all sorts of bureaucratic rice bowls (each agency tends to
view its senior officers and executives for its “internal use only”) is an
understatement, and the resistance to such a notion will be considerable. Yet
it must be overcome if the nation wants senior military and civilian leaders
who are able to effectively lead the NSE.

16 Federated Human Resource Management in the Federal Government: The Intelligence
Community Model (Thompson, IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2010),
available at: http://www.businessofgovernment.org/report/federated-humanresource-management-federal-government-intelligence-community-model.
17 It is interesting to note that DOD’s civilian intelligence executives are not included in
the DEAB’s talent review.
18 Ibid.
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